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Abstract— A mobile ad-hoc network is an autonomous system of 
mobile nodes connected by wireless links in which nodes cooperate 
by forwarding packets for each other thereby enabling 
communication beyond direct wireless transmission range. The 
wireless and dynamic nature of ad-hoc networks makes them 
vulnerable to attacks especially in routing protocols. Providing 
security in mobile ad-hoc networks has been a major issue over the 
recent years. One of the prominent mesh base reactive multicast 
routing protocols used in ad-hoc networks is On Demand Multicast 
Routing protocol (ODMRP). The security of ODMRP is compromised 
by a primary routing attack called black hole attack. In this attack a 
malicious node advertises itself as having the shortest path to the 
node whose packets it wants to intercept. This paper discusses the 
impact of black hole attack on ODMRP under various scenarios. The 
performance is evaluated using metrics such as packet delivery ratio 
and end to end delay for various numbers of senders and receivers 
via simulation. Simulations are carried out using network simulator 
ns-2. The results enable us to propose solutions to counter the effect 
of black hole attack.   
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
 Security in wireless ad-hoc networks is a complex issue. 
This complexity is due to various factors like insecure wireless 
communication links, absence of a fixed infrastructure, node 
mobility and resource constraints [1]. Nodes are more 
vulnerable to security attacks in mobile ad-hoc networks than 
in traditional networks with a fixed infrastructure. The security 
issues of Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANETs) are more 
challenging in a multicasting environment with multiple 
senders and receivers. There are different kinds of attacks by 
malicious nodes that can harm a network and make it 
unreliable for communication. These attacks can be classified 
as active and passive attacks [2]. A passive attack is one in 
which the information is snooped by an intruder without 
disrupting the network activity. An active attack disrupts the 
normal operation of a network by modifying the packets in the 
network. Active attacks can be further classified as internal 
and external attacks. External attacks are carried out by nodes 
that do not form part of the network. Internal attacks are from 
compromised nodes that were once legitimate part of the 
network. 
 
A black hole attack is one in which a malicious node 
advertises itself as having the shortest path to a destination in a 
network. This can cause Denial of Service (DoS) by dropping 
the received packets. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next 
section gives an overview of ODMRP. Section III discusses 
about black hole attack. Section IV over views security in ad-
hoc networks. In section V the results of simulation 
experiments that show the impact of black hole attack on the 
performance of ODMRP under scenarios are discussed. 
Finally section VI summarizes the conclusion. 
II. OVERVIEW OF ODMRP 
 ODMRP is a mesh based multicast routing protocol that 
uses the concept of forwarding group. Only a subset of nodes 
forwards the multicast packets on shortest paths between 
member pairs to build a forwarding mesh for each multicast 
group [3]. 
 
O – Mobile node 
S – Multicast Source 
R – Multicast Receiver 
______ JREQ 
_ _ _ _ _ JREP 
 
Figure 1 On demand route and mesh creation 
 
 
     In ODMRP, group membership and multicast routes are 
established and updated by the source on demand. When a 
multicast source has packets to send, it initiates a route 
discovery process. A JOIN REQUEST packet is periodically 
broadcast to the entire network. Any intermediate node that 
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receives a non- duplicate JREQ packet stores the upstream 
node ID and rebroadcasts the packet. Finally when this packet 
reaches the destination, the receiver creates a JOIN REPLY 
and broadcasts it to its neighbors. Every node receiving the 
JREP checks to see if the next node id in JREP matches its 
own. If there is a match, it is a part of the forwarding group, 
sets its FG_FLAG and broadcasts its JREP built upon matched 
entries. This JREP is thus propagated by each forwarding 
group member until it reaches the source via a shortest path. 
Thus routes from sources to receivers build a mesh of nodes 
called forwarding group. 
     The forwarding group is a set of nodes that forward the 
multicast packets. It supports shortest paths between any 
member pairs. All nodes inside the bubble (multicast members 
and forwarding group nodes) forward multicast data packets. 
A multicast receiver can also be a forwarding group node if it 
is on the path between a multicast source and another receiver.  
The mesh provides richer connectivity among multicast 
members compared to trees.  
After the route establishment and route construction process, 
a multicast source can transmit packets to receivers via 
selected routes and forwarding groups. A data packet is 
forwarded by a node only if it is not a duplicate one and the 
setting of the FG_Flag for the multicast group has not expired. 
This procedure minimizes traffic overhead and prevents 
sending packets through stale routes. 
In ODMRP, no explicit control packets need to be sent to 
join or leave the group. A multicast source can leave the group 
by just stop sending JREQ packets when it does not have any 
data to be sent to the group. If a receiver no longer wants to 
receive data from a particular group, it removes the 
corresponding entries from its member table and does not 
transmit the JOINTABLE for that group.  
 
III. BLACK HOLE ATTACK 
 
A black hole attack is one in which a malicious node uses 
the routing protocol  to advertise itself as having the shortest 
path to the node whose packets it wants to intercept[4]. This 
attack aims at modifying the routing protocol so that traffic 
flows through a specific node controlled by the attacker. The 
attacker drops the received messages instead of relaying them 
as the protocol requires. Therefore the quantity of routing 
information available to other nodes is reduced. The attack can 
be accomplished either selectively or in bulk. Selective 
dropping means dropping packets for a specified destination or 
a packet every‘t’ seconds or a packet every ‘n’ packets or a 
randomly selected portion of packets[5]. Bulk attack results in 
dropping all packets. Both result in degradation in the 
performance of the network.  
 
A. Black hole problem in ODMRP 
 
ODMRP is an important on demand routing protocol that 
creates routes only when desired by the source node. ODMRP 
does not include any provisions for security and hence it is 
susceptible to attacks .When a node requires a route to a 
destination it initiates a route discovery process within the 
network. Any malicious node can interrupt this route 
discovery process by claiming to have the shortest route to the 
destination thereby attracting more traffic towards it. For 
example, source A wants to send packets to destination D, in 
fig.1, source A initiates the route discovery process. Let M be 
the malicious node which has no fresh route to destination D. 
M claims to have the route to destination and sends join reply 
JREP packet to S. The reply from the malicious node reaches 
the source node earlier than the reply from the legitimate node, 
as the malicious node does not have to check its routing table 
like the other legitimate nodes. The source chooses the path 
provided by the malicious node and the data packets are 
dropped. The malicious node forms a black hole in the 
network and this problem is called black hole problem. called 
black hole problem. 
 
  
  
A-Source node 
D-Destination node 
M-Malicious node  
- - - - JREQ 
____ JREP 
 
Figure 2 Black hole attack 
 
IV. RELATED WORK 
 
Several researchers have addressed the problem of 
securing unicast routing protocols for ad-hoc networks. 
Ariadne [7], Secure Aware Ad-Hoc Routing (SAR) [8], Secure 
Efficient Ad-Hoc Distance (SEAD) Vector Routing Protocol 
[9], Secure AODV [10], Authenticated Routing for Ad-Hoc 
Network (ARAN) [11], Secure Routing Protocol (SRP) [12] 
and Secure Link- State Protocol (SLSP) [12] are all based on 
unicast routing protocols. Also these protocols do not address 
the problem of black hole attack. Marti, S., Giuli, T. J., Lai, 
K., & Baker, M.[13] have proposed a Watchdog and Pathrater 
approach against black hole attack which is implemented on 
top of source routing protocol such as DSR (Dynamic Source 
Routing). Ramanujam et al. [2] have presented some general 
techniques collectively called as TIARA (Techniques for 
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Intrusion resistant Ad-Hoc Routing Algorithms) to protect ad-
hoc networks from attacks. 
CONFIDANT (Cooperative of Nodes, Fairness In 
Dynamic Ad-hoc Networks) [10] is an extended version of 
Watchdog and Pathrater which uses a mechanism similar to 
Pretty Good Privacy for expressing various levels of trust, key 
validation and certification. It is also implemented on unicast 
routing protocol such as DSR. These papers have not 
addressed the challenges in multicast routing protocols which 
are our focus in this paper. 
 
 
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
 
The performance of a network depends on many factors 
such as number of senders, receivers, attackers and their 
positions. The performance of ODMRP has been observed in 
different scenarios. 
 
A. Simulation Environment and Metrics 
 
The simulation is done using the ns-2 simulator. The 
metrics used in evaluating the performance are: 
Packet Delivery Ratio: The ratio of the number of data packets 
delivered to the destinations to the number of data packets 
generated by the sources. 
Average End-to-End Delay: This is the average delay between 
the sending of packets by the source and its receipt by the 
receiver. This includes all possible delays caused during data 
acquisition, route discovery, queuing, processing at 
intermediate nodes, retransmission delays, propagation time, 
etc. [5].  It is measured in milliseconds. 
 
B. Simulation Profile 
 
       The simulation settings are as follows. The network 
consists of 50 nodes placed randomly within an area of 1000m 
x 1000 m. Each node moves randomly and has a transmission 
range of 250m. The random way point model is used as the 
mobility model. In this model, a node selects a random 
destination and moves towards that destination at a speed 
between the pre-defined maximum and minimum speed. The 
minimum speed for the simulations is 0 m/s while the 
maximum speed is 50 m/s. The simulations were carried out 
with 2, 5, 7 and 9 attackers for different number of receivers. 
The malicious nodes were selected randomly. 
 
C. Discussion of results 
 
Fig.1 shows the variation of PDR with mobility for 1 
sender and 20 receivers when the number of attackers are 
varied from 0 to 5. It is seen that the PDR decreases with 
increased mobility.   
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Figure 3 PDR for 1 sender and 20 receivers 
 
          
         The drop in PDR in the presence of a single attacker is 
only around 1%. When the number of attackers is increased to 
3, the drop in PDR increases by 10% and a further drop of 5% 
is observed when the number of attackers is increased to 
5.Higher the number of attackers, higher the reduction in PDR. 
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Figure 4 PDR for 1 sender and 30 receivers 
 
 
       A similar situation in seen in fig. 4 also but, as the number 
of receivers in this case is increased to 30, the impact of the 
attack is comparatively lesser. This is due to the fact that more 
number of receivers results in a denser routing mesh providing 
alternate paths for the data packets. Given the same number of 
attackers, the PDR is higher for higher number of receivers. 
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Figure 5 PDR for 3 senders and 20 receivers 
 
          Fig. 5 shows an increase in the value of PDR compared 
to fig. 3. This can be attributed to the increased number of 
senders thereby providing more alternate paths for the data 
packets. Even if a packet gets dropped in one path due to the 
presence of black hole nodes, there is a chance for the 
duplicate copy of the packet to reach the destination through 
alternate paths free from malicious nodes. 
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Figure 6 PDR for 3 senders and 30 receivers 
 
         The increase in PDR when the number of receivers is 
increased from 20 to 30 with the same number of senders 
varies from 1% in the absence of attackers to 3% in the 
presence of 5 attackers. This is clearly depicted in fig.6. 
 
          From the above graphs we conclude that a large 
multicast group with more number of senders and receivers 
are more resilient to black hole attack than a smaller group. 
This is due to the presence of more alternative paths available 
to route duplicate copies of the data packets. 
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Figure 7 Delay for 1 sender and 20 receivers 
 
 
        Fig.7 shows the variation of end to end delay for different 
number of attackers in the presence of 1 sender and 20 
receivers. There seems to be an increase in the delay in the 
presence of attackers. 
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Figure 8 Delay for 1 sender and 30 receivers 
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Figure 9 Delay for 3 senders and 20 receivers 
 
 
This is due to the fact that non shortest paths containing black 
hole nodes are selected for routing the packets. Also we see 
that the delay increases with increased group size as shown in 
fig. 8.  
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 Figure 10. Delay for 3 senders and 30 receivers 
 
 
         End to end delay includes all delays caused during route 
discovery, transmission delays, processing at intermediate 
nodes, etc. Obviously, a larger group accounts to a larger 
delay. This is clearly depicted in fig. 9 and fig. 10. 
 
 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
     Security is one of the major issues in MANETs. In this 
paper the effect of black hole attack on MANETs  has been 
analysed. The multicast routing protocol ODMRP has been 
simulated with black hole nodes under different scenarios.The 
performance of a multicast routing protocol under black hole 
attack depends on factors such as number of multicast senders, 
number of multicast receivers and number of black hole nodes 
      From the simulation results it is observed that, the packet 
delivery ratio reduces with increased mobility of the nodes and 
also with increased number of black hole nodes and affect the 
performance of the network. Also the packet delivery ratio is 
higher for large number of receivers for the same number of 
attackers. That is, the effect of the attack is more in a small 
group than in a large group. A large group is able to withstand 
the attack to a reasonable extent when compared to a smaller 
group which is easily susceptible to attacks. This can be 
attributed to the existence of alternate paths for routing the 
data packets. 
      The results also depict that the delay increases with 
increase in group size and increase in number of attackers. 
This is because of the fact that non shortest paths containing 
black hole nodes are selected for routing the packets. 
      To implement security over ODMRP, all route request 
messages are to be authenticated. Several mechanisms can be 
found in literature for authentication. A self organized public 
key infrastructure can be used to authenticate the nodes 
participating in the route discovery process so that 
compromised nodes can be easily identified and excluded 
from the network. 
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